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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most prominent instances of an unregulated custody transfer
within the United States involved Arkansas state representative Justin Harris.
Harris and his wife began the adoption process of three young girls in 2012,
finalizing the adoption of two of them in March 2013.1 The Harrises soon
decided that the girls were violent and that this violence jeopardized the
safety of the couple’s biological sons.2 Despite this, the couple said they
were fearful of involving the Arkansas Department of Human Services
because doing so might lead to charges of abandonment that could affect the
custody of their biological children.3 In October 2013, the girls were given
to an employee who had worked at a daycare run by the Harrises, and by
March of 2014 it was discovered that one of the girls had been sexually
assaulted by the man into whose custody they had been placed.4 That man,
Eric Francis, is now serving a forty-year sentence for the sexual assault, as
well as for two additional incidents of sexual assault involving other
children.5 There was no government oversight or involvement at any point
in the transfer of the girls from the Harrises to Francis.6
On April 6, 2015, Arkansas responded by enacting legislation7 that was
designed to combat the practice of unregulated custody transfers within the
state.8 Despite this legislation, the Harrises have not faced criminal or civil
liability for their part in the unregulated custody transfer of their two adopted
daughters, as their actions were legal prior to the passing of the rehoming
legislation.9 The outrage generated when the unregulated custody transfer first
came to light was also insufficient to oust Justin Harris from public office.10

1
Benjamin Hardy, Months After the Rehoming of Their Adopted Daughters Was Made
Public, Justin and Marsha Harris Have Yet to Face Consequences, ARK. TIMES (May 28, 2015),
http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/months-after-the-rehoming-of-their-adopted-daugh ters-wasmade-public-justin-and-marsha-harris-have-yet-to-face-consequences/Content?oid=3871740.
One of the girls was returned to the Arkansas Department of Human Services prior to the
finalization of the adoption due to difficulties stemming from the girl’s behavioral issues.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
H.B. 1676, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015), http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/asse
mbly/2015/2015R/Pages/BillInformation.aspx?measureno=HB1676 (last visited Sept. 20, 2017).
8
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-211(b) (West 2016).
9
See Hardy, supra note 1.
10
See Legislator List, ARKANSAS STATE LEGISLATURE, http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembl
y/2015/2015R/Pages/LegislatorSearchResults.aspx?member=&committee=All&chamber= (last
visited Sept. 28, 2016) (listing Justin Harris as the representative of the eighty-first district).
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The sexual assault and unregulated custody transfer went undetected until
an anonymous phone call to Arkansas’ child maltreatment hotline led to the
discovery of the unregulated transfer and subsequent abuse.11 Because no
oversight was mandated, there was no requirement that Francis receive the
type of background checks and home studies12 that are standard in adoption
proceedings.13 Those precautions are designed to ensure that the best
interests of children are protected. Absent government intervention or
management of custody transfers, the girls in the Harris case were exposed to
risks that might otherwise have been avoided.
“Unregulated custody transfers” involve the permanent transfer of
custody of an adopted child to a third party, often using a legal device like a
power of attorney in order to give the third-party legal control of the child.
The third-parties in these transfers can be anyone, regardless of their
qualification or previous history with children, and because there is no
government oversight or notice of such transfers the children are potentially
exposed to substantial harm.14 Information regarding the frequency of these
transfers is scarce, but evidence suggests that the problem affects children
adopted internationally more regularly than children adopted domestically.
This Note argues that the United States is not currently committed to
actively combating the practice of unregulated custody transfers based on its
existing international obligations. This Note arrives at that conclusion by
exploring the international instruments that might currently bind the United
States to take proactive steps to prevent the practice, thereby safeguarding
the best interests of children adopted internationally.
Part I will explore the problem of unregulated custody transfers, including
instances where such transfers have exposed the involved children to harm.
This Note will then briefly examine the current legal framework within the
11
Benjamin Hardy, A Child Left Unprotected, ARK. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.arkti
mes.com/arkansas/a-child-left-unprotected/Content?oid=3691164.
12
Home studies are investigations into the home of prospective adoptive parents that are
designed “to ensure that each child is placed in a suitable home and that good matches are
made between children and families.” Home Studies, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION
GATEWAY, https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/adoption/adoptive/home-study/ (last visited
Dec. 19, 2016); see also U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-733, CHILD WELFARE:
STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO ADDRESS UNREGULATED CUSTODY TRANSFERS OF ADOPTED
CHILDREN (2015) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (“[A] home study [is] performed by a licensed
professional to assess the suitability of the prospective parents, such as their health, finances,
and criminal history.”).
13
See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 6–7 (discussing many of the checks adoptive parents
must go through when seeking to adopt a child).
14
This practice is commonly referred to as “rehoming,” after the analogous practice of
finding a new home for a problematic pet. However, equating children with animals makes
the “unregulated custody transfer” terminology preferable.
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United States. Part II will examine the current standing of international law
that is most directly relevant to the problem, focusing on instruments
concerning children’s rights, illegal adoption, and human trafficking to which
the United States is, at least arguably, bound, and will end with a discussion of
the child’s “best interests standard” within international law. Part III begins by
analyzing whether the child’s best interests standard as understood by the
international community is applicable to the United States and will conclude
that the United States arguably has committed itself to safeguarding the best
interests of children. Despite the foregoing, this Note will argue that the openended nature of the best interests standard makes it difficult to say that the
United States must take any particular course of action to combat the practice
of unregulated custody transfers. Further, even if the United States is obligated
to act, it is unclear what such action would look like, and whether it would be
any different than the current approach which leaves the regulation of family
matters up to each constituent U.S. state. Part III then compares unregulated
custody transfers to illegal adoptions and human trafficking and argues that the
substantive elements of both practices, as currently understood within
international law, are manifested through such transfers. Despite the
similarities, however, the present understanding of what constitutes illegal
adoption and human trafficking in the international community makes it
unlikely that such transfers are covered under international law. This Note
argues that the definitions of both illegal adoption and human trafficking
should be explicitly expanded to include unregulated custody transfers, insofar
as the practice effectively satisfies the elements of both illegal activities.
Finally, this Note will briefly examine potential strategies for dealing with
unregulated custody transfers, focusing on ways to decrease the number of
transfers that occur and to increase the likelihood of intervention when they do.
II. THE PROBLEM OF UNREGULATED CUSTODY TRANSFERS
The practice of “unregulated custody transfers,” popularly known as “rehoming,” came to the public’s attention in the United States in late 2013,
following the publication of an exposé examining the practice.15
15

See Megan Twohey, The Child Exchange: The Network, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2013), http://
www.reuters.com/investigates/adoption/#article/part1. This seminal piece on unregulated
custody transfers—a 2014 finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting—focused
on internet messaging boards that were being used as virtual meeting places/exchanges. 2014
Pulitzer Prize Winners & Finalists, THE PULITZER PRIZES, http://www.pulitzer.org/prizewinners-by-year/2014 (last visited Sept. 20, 2017). The article found that one Yahoo message
board (now closed) had 261 children offered for unregulated custody transfers over a five-year
period, yielding an average of about one child per week. Of these 261 children, at least 70%
were born overseas.
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Unregulated custody transfers involve the transfer of custody of an adopted
child to a third party by an adoptive parent, often via the use of a power of
attorney.16 There is no government oversight or notification of the custody
transfer, which means there are no official means by which the best interests
of the child or children17 are protected.18 Until very recently, these transfers
were technically legal in every constituent state of the United States, and
they remain so in the vast majority of those constituent states.19
As indicated above, significant obstacles make combating this practice
difficult. First, U.S. states are generally left to combat the practice
individually, and what interstate coordination exists that might be brought to
bear on the problem of unregulated custody transfers is inadequate.20
Second, despite some federal interest on the topic,21 no new legislation has
been proposed to address the issue at a national level. This inconsistent
attention leaves adopted children—and particularly internationally adopted
children—vulnerable to the potential harms inherent in the practice.22 These
harms are not merely theoretical: there are documented instances where
children were left with people who were later convicted for possession of
child pornography or were accused of sleeping naked in the same bed as a
child acquired through one of these transfers.23

16

Twohey, supra note 15.
The “best interests of the child” is a legal term of art used to describe the standard by
which decisions concerning a child are to be judged in both the public and private spheres.
This standard is enshrined within the international community in Article 3 of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. See G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 4, ¶ 1, Convention
on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Child Rights Convention]. The
official comments on Article 3 describe the best interests of the child as a substantive right, an
interpretive legal principle, and a rule of procedure. See Comm. on the Rights of the Children,
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/14, at 3–4 (May 29, 2013). The comments to Article 3 include a nonexhaustive list of factors, relevant to a best interests of the child analysis, centered around
protecting and advancing the overall well-being of the child. See generally id.
18
See Twohey, supra note 15.
19
See infra Part II.A for a more detailed discussion of the status of unregulated custody
transfer legislation within the United States. The United States has a federal system of
government wherein each of the constituent states is a sovereign power with legislative
authority. Although the federal government is empowered to legislate in some areas, the
individual constituent states are primarily responsible for the creation and enforcement of
criminal legislation within their respective jurisdictions. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
20
See infra note 61, for a discussion of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.
21
See GAO REPORT, supra note 12 (discussing the scope of the practice at a national level
and displaying a variety of approaches to tackling the problem).
22
See Twohey, supra note 15.
23
Id.
17
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The legislative responses to the issue of unregulated transfers within the
United States have not demonstrated movement towards a unified,
nationwide solution to the problem. Relatively few U.S. states have existing
legislation aimed at combating the practice, and few of those states laws do
more than impose limits on the time during which custody can be transferred
to a non-relative third party through use of a power of attorney.24 What
momentum there was at the federal level appears to have faltered, and there
has been no official congressional action since the Government
Accountability Office published a report in 2015, at Congress’s request, on
the topic of unregulated custody transfers.25
The focus on the United States is not misplaced, given its prominence in
international adoption. By sheer numbers, the United States is the world’s
leading “receiving” country (a country that is the recipient of adopted
children),26 taking in nearly half of all children adopted internationally from
2004 to 2015.27 Because the United States receives such a large proportion
of internationally adopted children, the status of unregulated custody
transfers within the current understanding of the international law—
particularly the international legal framework around illegal adoption and
human trafficking—is relevant worldwide.
A. Background
Evidence suggests that older children adopted internationally are more
likely to be the subject of an unregulated custody transfer, though little data
on the actual shape and scope of the problem exist due to the underground
nature of the practice.28 Even though any given child is a potential victim of
24

See infra Part III.C for a detailed discussion of U.S. law on a state-by-state basis.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 12. Despite the initial interest at the federal level, a survey
of current federal legislation did not uncover any statutes that target the practice of
unregulated custody transfers.
26
In international adoption, the “receiving country” is the country which will receive the
adopted child. In contrast, the “sending country” is the country from which a child will be
adopted. Developed nations tend to be receiving countries, while poorer developing countries
tend to be sending countries. See Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption, in CHILDREN
AND YOUTH IN ADOPTION, ORPHANAGES, AND FOSTER CARE 63, 66 (Lori Askeland ed., 2006).
27
From 2004 to 2015, the United States adopted 165,504 children internationally, while the
remaining twenty-three responding countries adopted 178,364 children internationally. See
Peter Selman, Global Statistics for Intercountry Adoption: Receiving States and States of
Origin 2004–2015, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2017), https://
assets.hcch.net/docs/a8fe9f19-23e6-40c2-855e-388e112bf1f5.pdf.
28
See Twohey, supra note 15 (observing that the majority of children advertised on internet
messaging boards for the purpose of transferring custody ranged in age from six to fourteen
years old); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 4 (“[R]eports of unregulated transfers
have primarily pertained to children adopted internationally or from foster care); id. at 13–14
25
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the practice, many children adopted overseas are more prone to victimization
because they come from institutionalized settings which have been linked to
behavioral, emotional, or developmental problems.29 This presents unique
challenges with which adoptive parents may struggle to cope, thereby
threatening to disrupt or dissolve the adoption.30 It can also be more difficult
to get accurate child histories, and adoptive parents may not be prepared to
handle any undisclosed or undiagnosed behavioral, mental, or emotional
problems with which a child may be struggling.31
According to the U.S. Department of State, no federal requirements
mandate post-adoption reviews or reports, though a country of origin—i.e.,
the country where the child is from—may require periodic reports within a
specified timeframe following an international adoption of a child.32 Further,
the post-adoption help available to struggling adoptive parents from the
government or the adoption agency with whom they worked is often limited
or non-existent.33 It is also practically impossible to break the legally-created
parent-child relationship or accomplish involuntary termination of parental
rights without judicial intervention.34 In fact, there are no state-sanctioned or
formal means by which an adoptive parent in the United States can end his or
her parental relationship with a child following the finalization of an
adoption decree.35 Without adequate resources and a state-sanctioned way to
dissolve a fatally troubled adoption, parents are left in limbo. Parents are not

(noting that under 8% of children adopted internationally in 2013 were younger than one year
old, and that a 2013 study found that almost half of adoptive parents surveyed said that their
internationally adopted children had diagnosed special needs).
29
See Dana E. Johnson, Know the Risks: Adopting an Institutionalized Child, ADOPTIVE
FAMILIES ASSOCIATION OF BC, https://www.bcadoption.com/resources/articles/know-risksadopting-institutionalized-child (last visited Dec. 21, 2016) (discussing the types of mental
and physical issues associated with the adoption of post-institutionalized children); see also
RUTH LYN MEESE, CHILDREN OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS IN SCHOOL: A PRIMER FOR
PARENTS AND PROFESSIONALS 4–17 (2002) (discussing pre-adoption care of adopted children
from several prominent sending countries, and the connection between institutionalization and
the health and developmental difficulties it causes children).
30
GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 5 (“[A]n adoption may be terminated as a result of
disruption, which occurs before the adoption is finalized, or a dissolution, which occurs after
the adoption is finalized.”); MEESE, supra note 29, at 4–17.
31
Twohey, supra note 15; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 5.
32
GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.
33
Id. at 20–24.
34
Andrea B. Carroll, Breaking Forever Families, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 259, 260 n.7 (2015)
(citing Tiffany Woo, Comment, When the Forever Family Isn’t: Why State Laws Allowing
Adoptive Parents to Voluntarily Rescind an Adoption Violate the Adopted Child’s Equal
Protection Rights, 39 SW. L. REV. 569, 571–72 (2010)) (highlighting how rare it has
historically been for courts to set aside finalized adoption decrees).
35
Id. at 260–61.
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only unable to maintain their custodial relationship with the child, but they
also lack a legally-sanctioned way of permanently relinquishing that custody.
B. Unregulated Custody Transfers as a “Solution”
Unregulated custody transfers offer a way out of an adoption—a way that
avoids the potential legal consequences of a finding of abuse or neglect, and
one of the only possible means by which adoptive parents in the United
States can relinquish custody of a child. A common mechanism for
effectuating these transfers is the use of a power of attorney, “a notarized
statement declaring the child to be in the care of another adult.”36 A power
of attorney acts as a legal loop-hole of sorts. Although parents cannot legally
divest themselves of their parental rights and obligations through use of a
power of attorney, they can practically achieve the same effect by enabling a
caretaker to make major decisions regarding a child.37 Normally, the ability
to use a power of attorney to transfer temporary custody of a child can be
advantageous. For example, parents deployed overseas can confer on a
friend or relative the power of attorney to temporarily transfer custody of a
child, thereby protecting the best interests and welfare of the child without
requiring government intervention.38 However, this same tool can be and has
been used as a way of establishing a permanent custodial relationship
without going through state-sanctioned processes designed to safeguard the
best interests of the child.39 When joined with the ability to find new homes
for children via the internet with virtual anonymity and privacy, the use of a
power of attorney offers parents a way out of an adoption unavailable
through traditional legal channels.
C. Relevant Legislation at the Level of the Constituent States of the United
States
There is no law directly concerning the unregulated custody transfer of
adopted children at the federal level of the United States, despite interest in
the subject as evidenced by the report issued by the Government

36

Twohey, supra note 15.
See O.C.G.A. § 19-9-123 (Westlaw current through the 2017 Session of the Georgia
General Assembly) for an example of the broad authority that can be granted via a power of
attorney.
38
Id. (laying out the authority of an agent authorized to care for a child using a power of
attorney).
39
See generally Twohey, supra note 15 (describing how a power of attorney can be used to
create a de facto custodial relationship between an agent and a child).
37
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Accountability Office in 2015.40 However, legislatures of the constituent
states of the United States began to respond to the problem of unregulated
custody transfers in 2014.41 To date, twelve of those states have legislation
that targets some aspect of unregulated custody transfers. Eight states—
Arkansas,42 Colorado,43 Florida,44 Kentucky,45 Louisiana,46 Maine,47
Missouri,48 and Nevada49—have passed laws making it a felony to engage in
unregulated custody transfers. New Hampshire,50 North Dakota,51 Rhode
Island,52 and Wisconsin53 also have laws targeting these custody transfers,
but the penalties proscribed are misdemeanors.54
Of the twelve U.S. states that have passed legislation that targets some
aspect of unregulated custody transfers, few have targeted the various ways
such transfers are effectuated. For example, Florida’s relevant statute
prohibits the use of any public media to advertise either that a child is

40

See GAO REPORT, supra note 12.
Wisconsin was the first U.S. state to target the practice with the passing of legislation in
2014. Barnini Chakraborty, Wisconsin Becomes First State to Restrict Parents from Giving
Up Adopted Kids, FOX NEWS (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/04/18/
wisconsin-becomes-first-state-to-ban-advertising-adopted-kids-online.html.
42
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-211(b) (Westlaw through the 2017 legislative sessions)
(effective July 22, 2015).
43
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-213.5 (Westlaw through August 8, 2017) (effective July 1, 2014).
44
FLA. STAT. § 63.212(1)(g) (Westlaw through the 2017 First Regular Session and Special
“A” Session) (effective July 1, 2014).
45
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.352 (Westlaw through the end of the 2017 Regular Session)
(effective July 15, 2016).
46
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:46.4 (Westlaw through the 2017 Second Extraordinary Session)
(effective Aug. 1, 2016).
47
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-a, § 5-104 (Westlaw through the 2017 First Regular Session)
(amended 2017) (effective Jan. 1, 2017).
48
MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.110 (Westlaw through the 2017 First Regular Session and First
and Second Extraordinary Sessions).
49
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.240 (Westlaw current through the 79th Regular Session
(2017)).
50
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:33 (Westlaw through the 2017 Regular Session).
51
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-10-05 (Westlaw through 2017 Regular Session).
52
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-72.1-4(d) (Westlaw through Chapter 302 of the January 2017
Session).
53
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.979 (Westlaw through 2017 Act 57) (effective Apr. 27, 2016).
54
Going further, the average period of incarceration across those twelve states is thirty-four
months, and the range is anywhere from six months (Rhode Island) to sixty months
(Louisiana). Similarly, the average fine for those states is $14,966.67, and the range extends
from $500 (Rhode Island) to $100,000 (Colorado). The applicability of the laws also varies,
with some states (e.g., Arkansas) only focusing on unregulated custody transfers involving
adopted children, while other states (e.g., Louisiana) do not specify that a child must have
been adopted for the legislation to be applicable.
41
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available for adoption or that a child is sought for adoption.55 Missouri, on
the other hand, prohibits the transfer of custody of a child without first
obtaining a court order approving or ordering the transfer.56 And North
Dakota prevents anyone other than a child’s parents from assuming the
permanent care and custody of a child—with the exception of placements
with a grandparent, uncle, or aunt—for the purposes of establishing a
permanent custodial relationship.57 Finally, Kentucky,58 Maine,59 and
Wisconsin60 only go so far as to prevent the use of a power of attorney to
transfer parental rights and responsibilities for more than one year.
Several obstacles make combating the practice at the level of the
constituent states of the United States difficult. First, U.S. states are
generally left to combat the practice individually, and what interstate
coordination exists that might be relevant to stopping unregulated custody
transfers is inadequate.61 Second, despite some federal interest in the topic,62
no new legislation has been proposed to address the issue of unregulated
custody transfers at the national level.
55
FLA. STAT. § 63.212(1)(g) (Westlaw current through the 2017 First Regular Session and
Special “A” Session of the 25th Legislature).
56
MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.110 (Westlaw through the 2017 First Regular Session and First
and Second Extraordinary Sessions).
57
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-10-05 (Westlaw through 2017 Regular Session).
58
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.352 (Westlaw through the end of the 2017 Regular Session).
59
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-a, § 5-104 (Westlaw through the 2017 First Regular Session)
(amended 2017).
60
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.979 (Westlaw through 2017 Act 57).
61
Every constituent state within the United States is a member of the Interstate Compact on
the Placement of Children (ICPC), a binding contract between those states designed to
facilitate custody transfers of children across state borders through the establishment of
uniform procedures and policies. Those states have each enacted the text of the Compact;
therefore, it is not federal legislation, despite its national scope. See ASS’N OF ADMINS. OF THE
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILD., http://www.aphsa.org/content/AAICPC/
en/home.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2017). This Compact is not necessarily responsive to the
issue of unregulated custody transfers, however, because it only applies to custody transfers of
children between U.S. states when the child is in the custody of one of those states or when
the child is being moved pursuant to a formal adoption or foster placement. As such, the
ICPC is powerless to stop the use of a power of attorney to effectuate a permanent custody
transfer, nor can it mandate oversight by the designated state agency responsible for
overseeing such transfers. Since neither of the triggering conditions are satisfied, the Compact
cannot be brought to bear on one of the common ways custody of children is given to new
caretakers in an unregulated custody transfer. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 39-4-4, art. III (Westlaw
current through the 2017 Session of the Georgia General Assembly) (incorporating the ICPC
into the Georgia state legislative code). Further, the Compact is dependent on state laws when
an illegal placement has occurred, so it has no independent ability to enforce its provisions.
See, e.g., id. art. IV.
62
See GAO REPORT, supra note 12 (discussing the scope of the practice of unregulated
custody transfers at a national level and recommending possible solutions to this problem).
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III. STATEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PERTAINING TO THE
INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION, HUMAN TRAFFICKING, AND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
Intercountry adoption entails the change in an “adopted child’s habitual
country of residence but not necessarily of the child’s citizenship.”63 The
United Nations estimated in 2005 that around 40,000 international adoptions
took place each year, accounting for 15% of all adoptions (both intra- and
intercountry) worldwide.64 The United States is the world’s leading
receiving country, but the United States adopts internationally at a lower rate
than many other receiving countries as a percentage of its overall number of
adoptions (both international and domestic).65
Because of their focus on adoption, human trafficking, or the concept of
the best interests of the child, several international instruments discussed in
this section can be roughly categorized as applicable to unregulated custody
transfers. This Note will focus primarily on widely applicable international
law, rather than bilateral or small multilateral instruments. It does so for two
reasons: first, international adoption involves many countries, and as such
the widest possible applications will be the most useful to combating
practices that harm those adoptive children; second, the United States is the
largest receiving country with respect to international adoptions.66 Since the
problem of unregulated custody transfers involves the “giving away” of
children who were received by the adopted parents, focusing narrowly on the
United States is an efficient way to combat the practice with respect to the
largest population of children adopted internationally.
A. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Child Rights
Convention) was adopted by the General Assembly in 1989 and entered into

63

See Child Adoption: Trends and Policies, DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/SER.A/292, U.N. Sales No. E.10.XIII.4, at 74 (2009), http://www.un.org/esa/popula
tion/publications/adoption2010/child_adoption.pdf.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 75. Table V.3 cites the percentage of international adoptions in the United States at
15%, while other receiving countries adopt internationally at a considerably higher rate. See,
e.g., France at 90%, Spain at 82%, Italy at 68%, Sweden at 65%, Norway at 76%, and
Belgium at 95%. Of the twenty-seven countries listed, only the United Kingdom (5%) and
Portugal (1%) adopted internationally at a rate lower than that of the United States. The
median rate for international adoption is 64% of all adoptions.
66
Selman, supra note 27.
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force in 1990.67 The Child Rights Convention was created because the
international community determined that the existing human rights
conventions and treaties did not adequately address the unique needs of
children,68 and that proactive measures should be taken to protect the rights
of children given children’s comparatively vulnerable status relative to
adults.69 The Child Rights Convention is binding on states parties rather than
individual persons, per the language of that Convention, meaning that states
parties are the entities responsible for protecting the rights set forth in that
instrument.70
As of 2016, the United States is the only member of the United Nations
that has not ratified the Child Rights Convention, though it is a signatory.71
The United States was also an active participant over the ten-year process
during which the Child Rights Convention was drafted.72 Despite this, the
Child Rights Convention has never been submitted to the Senate for
ratification, as required by the U.S. Constitution.73 This may reflect a
general wariness of international treaties—which might undermine the
sovereignty of the United States—as well as political opposition within the
United States.74 This opposition asserts that committing to that Convention

67

Child Rights Convention, supra note 17.
See Iara de Witte, Illegal Adoption as Child Trafficking: The Potential of the EU Antitrafficking Directive in Protecting Children and Their Original Family from Abusive
Intercountry Adoption 8 (May 2012) (unpublished master’s thesis, University of Amsterdam)
(discussing the reasons motivating the creation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child).
69
Id.; see also Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, at Preamble.
70
See, e.g., Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, art. 6 (“1. States Parties recognize that
every child has the inherent right to life. 2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent
possible the survival and development of the child.” (emphasis added)); see also id. art. 7(2)
(“States Parties shall ensure . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. art. 9(1) (“States Parties shall
ensure . . . .” (emphasis added)).
71
See United Nations Human Rights Office of the Commissioner, Status of Ratification
Interactive Dashboard, http://indicators.ohchr.org (select “Convention on the Rights of the
Child” from the “Select a treaty” dropdown box at the top of the page).
72
Susan Kilbourne, Opposition to U.S. Ratification of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child: Responses to Parental Rights Arguments, 4 LOY. POVERTY L.J. 55,
55–56 (1998).
73
Id. at 56; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
74
Kilbourne, supra note 72, at 57; see also Martha Middleton, The Last Holdout: The ABA
Adds its Voice to Calls for the United States to Ratify the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 102-MAR A.B.A. J. 64, 66 (2016) (discussing several reasons why the Child Rights
Convention has not been ratified by the United States); Amy C. Harfeld, Oh Righteous
Delinquent One: The United States’ International Human Rights Double Standard —
Explanation, Example, and Avenues for Change, 4 N.Y.C. L. REV. 59, 68 (2001) (“Opponents
of human-rights treaty ratification have justified their position with a wide array of arguments
that such instruments would: diminish fundamental American rights; violate states’ rights;
promote world government; subject citizens to trial abroad; enhance Communist/Socialist
68
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will threaten parental rights within the United States, insofar as the United
States will be committed to advancing and protecting the rights of children in
ways that might run counter to some parents’ preferences regarding things
like education and discipline.75 Additionally, the regulation of family
matters in the United States has traditionally been handled at the level of the
individual U.S. states.76 However, these worries run counter to both the
spirit and the drafting history of the Child Rights Convention.77 Perhaps
most importantly for the purposes of this Note, none of the objections relate
to Articles 21 and 35, discussed below, which are concerned with adoption
and the human trafficking of children, respectively.78
There are several key articles in the Child Rights Convention. First,
Article 3 declares: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration.”79 Under Article 3, States parties assume the
obligation to “ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for
his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her
parents . . . and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and
administrative measures.”80 States parties also assume the obligation to
“undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for
the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention”
within the means of those states.81 Article 9 is perhaps the most relevant to
the issue of unregulated custody transfers, as it declares that states parties
shall ensure that children will not be separated from their parents against
their will except in circumstances where competent authorities that are
subject to judicial review determine that the separation is necessary to protect
the best interests of the child.82
Article 18 shifts focus to a child’s parents and obligates States parties to
make efforts to recognize the principle that parents “have common

influence; infringe upon domestic jurisdiction; increase international entanglements; and
create self-executing obligations.”).
75
Kilbourne, supra note 72, at 58; id. at 97.
76
Id. at 57–58.
77
Id. at 61.
78
See generally id.
79
Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, art. 3. It is important to note that the language
references States and State actors, not private individuals.
80
Id. The importance of the “best interests of the child” standard will be explored more
fully in Part II.E.
81
Id. art. 4.
82
Id. art. 9.
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responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child.”83 This idea
of parental obligation to the child is extended in Article 19, which requires
States to take proactive measures to protect children from physical and
mental abuse, from either violence or neglect.84
Article 21 declares that adoption systems must protect the best interests of
the children, and that those interests will be “paramount” in adoption
proceedings.85 Article 27 states that children have a right to “a standard of
living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social
development” and that parents are responsible for providing that living
standard to the child, within the parents’ abilities and financial capacities.86
Further, Article 27 commits states parties to assist parents in the
implementation of that right so far as the state is capable.87 States parties
also assume the obligation to prevent trafficking of children in “any purpose
or in any form” under Article 35,88 though the exact nature of what
constitutes trafficking is not specified within the Child Rights Convention.
This lack of clarity was somewhat clarified with the enactment of the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, which will be discussed below.89
The United Nations Children’s Fund—commonly known as UNICEF—
produced an Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (Handbook) in 2007 which further elaborates on the rights and
obligations contained within the Convention.90 The Handbook suggests that
83

Id. art. 18.
Id. art. 19.
85
Id. art. 21.
86
Id. art. 27.
87
Id.
88
Id. art. 35.
89
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319 [hereinafter U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol].
Although there is an optional protocol to the Child Rights Convention that also mentions
human trafficking, it only does so with respect to the trafficking for the purposes of the sale of
children, child prostitution, and child pornography. See Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography,
Preamble, May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227 [hereinafter Optional Protocol]. This contains a
narrower definition than is found in the U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol, and the language
within the Optional Protocol suggests that the Optional Protocol is intended to focus on
human trafficking within the context of sexual exploitation, rather than to define the outer
boundaries of what constitutes human trafficking. See id. The Optional Protocol highlighting
the international community’s growing concern with sexual tourism, sexual exploitation of
children, and the growing availability of child pornography.
90
RACHEL HODGKIN & PETER NEWELL, UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND,
IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK FOR THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 37 (3d ed.
2007). The original version of the Handbook was published in 1998. Id. at XI.
84
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states parties interpret what constitutes a child’s best interests in ways that are
not overly culturally relative so as to deny to a child any of the rights contained
within the Child Rights Convention.91 The Handbook also recommended that
children be given independent representation of the child’s best interests
whenever a legal decision related to the child is made.92 With respect to
Article 9 of the Child Rights Convention, the Handbook states that: “The
words ‘against their will’ refer either to the parents’ will or to the parents’ and
child’s will together; the grammar makes clear that it does not mean the child’s
will alone.”93 However, in instances in which the will of the child and the
parents differs, the Handbook says that states should be willing to accept the
role of arbiter between the parties.94 The Handbook goes on to say that, at a
minimum, the state should establish judicial machinery by which the child can
make a case for arbitration, particularly where the state is willing to step in to
settle disputes between parents.95 Finally, the Handbook notes that a child
may experience neglect when a child’s parents are either unable to care for the
child’s needs, or intentionally do not care for the child’s needs, when
discussing the demands of Article 19.96
B. The Hague Adoption Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption
The Child Rights Convention establishes many child rights that states
should work to protect, but it generally sticks to open-textured language. For
example, with respect to adoption, the Child Rights Convention does not
state with specificity how states should safeguard children; it lists the goals,
but not the means.97 However, other instruments exist that create legal
frameworks that can protect the best interests of children in specific areas.
For adoption, the Hague Adoption Convention on Protection of Children and
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption98 was adopted in 1993
with the aim of establishing an international framework that would ensure
that children are protected during international adoptions.99 The Hague
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Id. at 38.
Id. at 242.
93
Id. at 122.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 257.
97
See, e.g., Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, art. 21.
98
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption art. I, May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Hague Adoption Convention].
99
Id. at Preamble.
92
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Adoption Convention has ninety-eight contracting states, including the
United States.100
Trevor Buck has said that two goals of the Hague Adoption Convention
are to help combat child trafficking and to reorient the international adoption
system by placing primary emphasis on the best interests of the child, rather
than on profit for those who were engaged in the international adoption
process.101 Unlike the Child Rights Convention, the Hague Adoption
Convention is not a human rights treaty, but rather a private law treaty.102 It
does not establish human rights; instead, the Hague Adoption Convention
builds upon the human rights framework established in the Child Rights
Convention, as evidenced by the Hague Adoption Convention’s preamble.103
The Hague Adoption Convention’s preamble states that the contracting states
want “to establish common provisions” so as to protect the rights and best
interests of a child who is the subject of intercountry adoption, “taking into
account the principles set forth in international instruments, in particular the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child . . . .”104
The objectives of the Hague Adoption Convention are enshrined in
Article 1, which highlights two of the purposes of the Convention. One
purpose is “to ensure that intercountry adoptions take place in the best
interests of the child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights as
recognised in international law.”105 Another purpose is “to establish a
system of co-operation amongst Contracting states to ensure that those
safeguards are respected and thereby prevent the abduction, the sale of, or
traffic in children.”106

100
See Status Table 33: Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=69 (last visited June
12, 2017) (listing the current member states to the Hague Adoption Convention).
101
TREVOR BUCK, INTERNATIONAL CHILD LAW 247 (2d ed. 2011).
102
Private law concerns the relationships between individuals and institutions, while public
law concerns the relationship between individuals and the State. Id. at 67; Public law,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Thus, the Hague Adoption Convention
establishes how private individuals will interact via a designated State entity throughout the
international adoption process, whereas the Child Rights Convention and the Anti-trafficking
Protocol establish how States will interact with individuals in light of substantive rights
granted by those (and related) documents.
103
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 98, at Preamble (stating that the Hague
Adoption Convention “tak[es] into account the principles set forth in international
instruments, in particular the [Child Rights Convention] . . .”).
104
Id.
105
Id. art. 1.
106
Id. (emphasis added).
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The Hague Adoption Convention requires that each member state
designate a “Central Authority.”107 That authority is responsible for ensuring
that, among other things:
i)
ii)

the child is adoptable;
after considering domestic options, international adoption
will be in the child’s best interests;
iii) those whose consent is required have been informed about
the legal consequences of consent to adoption and have
freely given consent;
iv) the child has been informed of the consequences of
adoption and has consented (where required), and the
child’s wishes have been considered;
v) and that consent has not been induced via payment or any
other form of compensation; and
vi) the would-be adoptive parents are fit and eligible to adopt
the child and have been counseled as is necessary.108
The designation of a central authority is crucial, because it allows member
states to trust one another throughout the intercountry adoption process, and
J.H.A. van Loon, the former Secretary General of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, has commented that the mandated oversight by
state authorities is the keystone of that trust.109 Finally, Article 29 of the
Hague Adoption Convention limits the type of contact that prospective
adoptive parents can have with birth parents,110 and Article 32 prohibits
anyone from receiving “improper financial or other gain” from activities
related to international adoption.111

107

Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 4.
109
See David M. Smolin, Abduction, Sale and Traffic in Children in the Context of
Intercountry Adoption, Information Document No. 1, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 8 (June, 2010), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/adop2010id01e.pdf
(quoting Secretary J.H.A. van Loon, who spoke in 2007 when the United States deposited its
ratification of the Hague Adoption Convention: “The Convention has created a global
framework that provides stability by giving countries the control they need to trust their
partners.”).
110
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 98, art. 29.
111
Id. art. 32.
108
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C. The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children
The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children112 entered into force in 2003 and has been
ratified by 172 states, including the United States.113 It acts as a supplement
to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.114
The Preamble states that the Anti-trafficking Protocol was necessary given
the lack of a comprehensive international framework with which to combat
human trafficking, and because trafficking victims would not otherwise be
adequately protected without such a protocol.115
It is important to note that the definition of human trafficking116 under the
Anti-trafficking Protocol is composed of three elements: activity, means, and
purpose.117 “Activity” is comprised of the “recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or receipt of person.”118 “Means” includes the “threat or
use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception,
of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person.”119 Finally, “purpose” involves “exploitation,”
which includes prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced labour or services,
slavery and similar practices, servitude, or the removal of organs.120
Understanding how each of these elements is interpreted is important when
determining the applicability of the Anti-trafficking Protocol to the practice
of unregulated custody transfers. Notably, Article 3(c) spells out an
exception when children are involved. To be precise, acts of “recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation” are considered trafficking even when the “means” listed in
Article 3(a) are not present.121

112

U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol, supra note 89.
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, DEPOSITORY, STATUS OF TREATIES (Sept. 21,
2017, 5:28 PM), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII12-a&chapter=18&clang=_en.
114
U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol, supra note 89, art. 1, ¶ 1.
115
Id. at Preamble.
116
The U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol uses the phrase “trafficking in persons,” but this Note
will proceed with the less unwieldy phrase “human trafficking.”
117
de Witte, supra note 68, at 50.
118
U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol, supra note 89, art. 3(a).
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. art. 3(c).
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D. Customary International Law
Outside of the instruments discussed above, there is an additional source
of international obligations recognized by the United States—customary
international law. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “customary international
law” as “[i]nternational law that derives from the practice of states and is
accepted by them as legally binding.”122 The definition contains two
elements: an identifiable practice of states and the acceptance by those states
of the practice as legally binding. This is a subjective stance towards the
practice, meaning that the practice must be viewed by the state as binding on
its actions in the international community. Customary international law
stems from “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation”123 as well as derivations from “general
principles common to the major legal systems of the world.”124 Customary
law originally required adherence over a substantial amount of time, but this
requirement has diminished in importance since World War II, perhaps
because improved communication made the practice of states widely and
quickly known where there is broad acceptance and no or little objection.125
Anthea Roberts has argued that the modern conception of customary
international law is “deductive” in nature, insofar as it is derived from
“general statements of rules rather than particular instances of practice.”126
Such custom “can develop quickly because it is deducted from multilateral
treaties and declarations by international fora such as the [U.N.] General
Assembly, which can declare existing customs, crystallize emerging
customs, and generate new customs.”127
The U.S. Constitution declares that “all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every [constituent] State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any [constituent] State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”128 U.S. federal courts have also acknowledged that
customary international law is binding, provided that the United States has not
122

Customary international law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. § 102(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1987).
124
Id. § 101(2)(c).
125
Id. at Reporter’s Notes (2).
126
Anthea Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A
Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 758 (2001).
127
Id.
128
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1987) (echoing the U.S. Constitution
by stating that international law and agreements to which the United States is a party are the
laws of that nation and “supreme over the law of the several [constituent] States”).
123
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exempted itself from the relevant customary international law and there is no
contradictory federal statute.129 Further, it has been argued that customary
international law could be considered federal common law, based on U.S.
Supreme Court decisions that have treated customary international law as
binding on the United States, though this debate has not been settled.130
The Child Rights Convention can be considered customary international
law with respect to the United States based on apparent subjective
acceptance of that Convention by the U.S. government. For example, the
U.S. Supreme Court referenced that Convention in a 2010 decision regarding
the imposition of sentences involving life without parole on minors and
highlighted that, although the Child Rights Convention was not binding on
the Court, the “overwhelming weight of international opinion against life
without parole for nonhomicide offenses committed by juveniles provides
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions . . . .”131
Further, the
[U.S. Supreme] Court has treated the laws and practices of
other nations and international agreements as relevant to the

129

See Oliva v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 229, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2005); see also United
States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (reiterating that “[i]t has long been
established that customary international law is part of the law of the United States to the
limited extent that where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations” and that
“public international law is controlling only in the absence of controlling positive law or
judicial precedent.” (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) and citing
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of
labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the
subjects with which they treat.” (emphasis added)). This judicial practice is not
uncontroversial, however. For a discussion on the controversy surrounding declarations by
U.S. federal courts holding customary international law to be binding on the United States, see
CURTIS BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 147–56 (2d ed. 2015).
130
See BRADLEY, supra note 129, at 147–56, which traces the history of customary
international law within American jurisprudence and highlights that, although conventional
wisdom in the 1980s was that customary international law had the status of federal common
law, this proposition has become more contentious in the intervening years. This debate is
important in large part because declaring customary international law to be federal common
law could give it preemptory status when such federal common law conflicts with the laws of
one of the constituent states of the United States. Id. at 149.
131
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

206

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 46:185

Eighth Amendment not because those norms are binding or
controlling but because the judgment of the world’s nations
that a particular sentencing practice is inconsistent with basic
principles of decency demonstrates that the Court’s rationale
has respected reasoning to support it.132
Instances where federal courts have declined to find enforceable obligations
arising under the Child Rights Convention have generally involved
contradictory federal law which, as described above, cannot be preempted by
customary international law.133
E. The Best Interests of the Child in International Law
One thread that runs through international law is the best interests of the
child legal standard, which has been an important concept for decades.134
This standard is understood to be a constantly evolving “dynamic concept”
that “encompasses various issues” by the Committee on the Rights of the
Children (Child Rights Committee).135 That body administers the Child
Rights Convention, and it has issued a General Comment that explores the
concept of the best interests standard within the context of Article 3 of the
Child Rights Convention.136
The Child Rights Committee has stated that the best interests standard
involves examining and balancing the various factors and potential
consequences of any decision pertaining to the welfare of a child in order to

132

Id. at 82.
See, e.g., Oliva, 433 F.3d at 234 (noting that “Congress has enacted legislation defining the
circumstances under which hardship to a child may appropriately be considered as a ground for
granting relief . . . . This statute, and not the [Child Rights Convention], necessarily determines
the outcome. . . .”); Mejia v. Holder, 492 Fed. Appx. 780, 781 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven if the
Convention on the Rights of the Child were customary international law, Congress may legislate
beyond the limits imposed by international law.”); see also Martinez-Lopez v. Gonzales, 454
F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2006) (memorandum decision) (“Given that Martinez-Lopez is directly
challenging a statute, he cannot appeal to customary international law.”).
134
See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Guidelines on
Determining the Best Interests of the Child (May 2008), http://www.unhcr.org/4566b16b2.pdf
(listing seven instruments that incorporate the best interests standard, including, e.g., the
Hague Adoption Convention, Child Rights Convention, and the African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child); see also Comm. on the Rights of the Children, General Comment
No. 14 (2013) on the Right of the Child to Have His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary
Consideration (Art. 3, ¶ 1), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/14 (2013), at I(A)(2) [hereinafter General
Comment on Art. 3].
135
General Comment on Art. 3, supra note 134, at II(11).
136
Id.
133
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ensure the child’s interests are effectively advanced.137 Explaining the nature
of the best interests standard, the Child Rights Committee has stated that
[i]t should be emphasized that the basic best interests assessment
is a general assessment of all relevant elements of the child’s
best interests, the weight of each element depending on the
others . . . . In weighing the various elements, one needs to bear
in mind that the purpose of assessing and determining the best
interests of the child is to ensure the full and effective enjoyment
of the rights recognized in the Convention and its Optional
Protocols, and the holistic development of the child.138
This standard is at the heart of the Child Rights Convention, which, as noted
above, is binding on all U.N. member states except for the United States.
The Child Rights Committee has noted that there is no “hierarchy of
rights,” and that “no right could be compromised by a negative interpretation
of the child’s best interests.”139 The child’s best interests should not only be
considered on a case-by-case basis, or only when state decisions overtly
affect the welfare of a single child; but even state actions, such as passing
budget legislation, should incorporate the best interests of the child.140
Further, the best interests of the child is to be understood as applying to both
individual children, as well as children as a group,141 and it is applicable to
decisions made in both the public and private spheres.142
Despite the fact that the United States is not a state party to the Child
Rights Convention, the best interests standard runs through the two Optional
Protocols to the Child Rights Convention to which the United States is a state
party.143 The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts states that its goal of
raising the age of recruitment of children into armed forces “will contribute
effectively to the implementation of the principle that the best interests of the

137

See id. at V(A)(2).
Id.
139
Id. at I(A).
140
Id. at IV(A)(2)(d).
141
Id. at IV(A)(1)(c).
142
Id. at I(A).
143
See United Nations Human Rights Office of the Commissioner, supra note 71 (select
“Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of
children in armed conflict” from the “Select a treaty” dropdown box at the top of the page);
see also id. (select “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale
of children, child prostitution and child pornography” from the “Select a treaty” dropdown
box at the top of the page).
138
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child are to be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children.”144
Similarly, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography specifies
that the best interests of children “shall be a primary consideration”
whenever victims of the specified illegal practices interact with a state
party’s criminal justice system.145 Interpretations of these Protocols must
reflect their complementary relationship to the Child Rights Convention and
“must always be guided by the principles of non-discrimination, best
interests of the child and child participation.”146 Given their complementary
nature, the interpretation of the best interests standard within the Child
Rights Convention can be read as informing and shaping the interpretation of
the Optional Protocols to which the United States is a party. The Hague
Adoption Convention is also shaped by the understanding of the principles
set forth in Child Rights Convention, as the Hague Adoption Convention
explicitly states that it takes “into account the principles set forth in
international instruments, in particular the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child. . . .”147
To reiterate, Article 3 states that “in all actions concerning children,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration.”148 Additionally, Article 3 says that
“States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is
necessary for his or her well-being.”149 The Child Rights Committee has
interpreted the concept of the best interests standard laid out in Article 3 as a
threefold concept: a substantive right, an interpretive principle, and a rule of
procedure.150 As a substantive right, the child has a right to have his or her
interests taken as a primary consideration.151 As an interpretive principle, in
the event that a legal provision is susceptible to multiple interpretations, the
interpretation that best serves the child’s interests should be chosen.152
Finally, as a rule of procedure, decision-making processes established by a
144
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflicts, Preamble, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 236.
145
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children,
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, art. 8(3), May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 247.
146
United Nations Children’s Fund, Advancing the CRC, https://www.unicef.org/crc/index_
protocols.html (last visited June 13, 2017).
147
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 98, at Preamble.
148
Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, art. 3(1).
149
Id. art. 3(2).
150
General Comment on Art. 3, supra note 134, at I(A)(6).
151
Id. at I(A)(6)(a).
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Id. at I(A)(6)(b).
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state party must include procedural guarantees any time evaluations of the
child’s best interests are made.153 Looked at as a whole, the Child Rights
Committee’s comment on Article 3 displays an understanding of the best
interests standard that is broad, pervasive, and holistic in its approach to
advancing the best interests of children whenever decisions impacting the
welfare of children must be made.
IV. ANALYSIS
This Part will explore whether the United States is currently obligated to
take proactive measures to combat the practice of unregulated custody
transfers. The analysis will begin with the more general best interests
standard, then move on to instruments pertaining to illegal adoption and
human trafficking. The reason behind starting with the more general best
interests standard is simple: it is a cornerstone of international human rights
law, as indicated by its place therein for the last half-century, as well as its
prominence within the Child Rights Convention.154 However, the best
interests standard’s broad scope and less-than-concrete nature, coupled with
the United States’ tenuous relationship with the Child Rights Convention,
makes that standard an ineffective means of motivating the United States to
proactively combat unregulated custody transfers. In light of this, this Part
will examine those transfers in relation to the analogous practices of illegal
adoption and human trafficking. Part IV will assert that expanding the
understanding of either of those unlawful practices, such that they encompass
unregulated custody transfers, is the most effective way of instigating change
within the United States at the national level in light of that country’s
existing international obligations.

153

Id. at I(A)(6)(c). To elaborate,
States must put into place formal processes, with strict procedural safeguards,
designed to assess and determine the child’s best interests for decisions
affecting the child, including mechanisms for evaluating the results. States
must develop transparent and objective processes for all decisions made by
legislators, judges or administrative authorities, especially in areas which
directly affect the child or children.
Id. at V(B).
154
The best interests standard has been a part of the development of international human rights
for decades; it was included in the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child. Id. at I(A).
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A. The United States is not Necessarily Obligated to Combat Unregulated
Custody Transfers Under the Best Interests Standard
The United States is likely bound to the best interests standard contained
within the Child Rights Convention by its numerous international
commitments. Such commitments include self-imposed commitments as a
state party to two Optional Protocols to the Child Rights Convention, the
interpretation of which are influenced by the principles laid out in that
Convention.155 Similarly, the United States is a state party to the Hague
Adoption Convention, which explicitly ties itself to the principles contained
within the Child Rights Convention.156 Going further, the near universal
adoption of the Child Rights Convention, as well as the long-standing place
of the best interests standard within international law, strongly suggests that
the standard has achieved the status of customary international law, as
discussed supra in Part III.D. That the United States has voluntary
committed itself to instruments that themselves incorporate the best interests
standard is evidence that the United States has adopted the subjective stance
required for a practice to obtain the status of customary international law.157
This means that the United States is arguably bound to adhere to the
requirements under the Child Rights Convention.
Unfortunately, even if one were to assume that the United States is bound
to consider the child’s best interests based on its existing treaty obligations
and/or customary international law, it is unclear what such a commitment
would actually entail. Although the Child Rights Committee’s comments on
Article 3 of the Child Rights Convention indicates that the best interests
standard is to be understood as a robust right that should be a foundational
consideration in all decisions affecting the well-being of children, the
language of Article 3 hints at limitations on that best interests standard. John
Quigley has pointed out that “the exercise by a child of a right is subject to
the guidance of the child’s parents. In this respect, the Convention would
seem to protect a child’s right less fully than human rights treaties of general
application, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”158
155
See UNICEF, Convention on the Rights of the Child: Optional Protocol on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (Nov. 30, 2005), https://www.unicef.org/
crc/index_30204.html (explaining that because the “Optional Protocol on the sale of children,
child prostitution and child pornography” is “a complement to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, interpretation of the Optional Protocol’s text must always be guided by the
principles of non-discrimination, best interests of the child and child participation.”).
156
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 98, at Preamble.
157
See Part II.D, supra.
158
John Quigley, U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 22 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 401, 404–05 (2003). Professor Quigley is the President’s Club
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Similarly, Quigley highlights that “Article 3 requires ratifying states to make
a child’s best interests ‘a primary consideration’. . . . The word ‘a’ here was
substituted for ‘the’ from earlier drafts to make clear that a child’s best
interest is not the overriding and only consideration.”159 The United States
itself objected to earlier drafts of Article 3 of the Child Rights Convention
that used “the paramount consideration,” rather than “a primary
consideration,” and the latter formulation was adopted as a compromise.160
The United States’ objection to the language contained within earlier
drafts of Article 3 indicates an unwillingness to elevate the best interests of
the child above all other considerations. This unwillingness is not
unfounded, as a member of the Child Rights Convention Working Group
noted at a 1981 meeting that “other parties might have equal or even superior
legal interests in some cases (e.g., medical emergencies during childbirth).161
Unfortunately, by forcing the child’s best interests to be weighed against the
rights and interests of others, it becomes more difficult to determine when a
child’s interests should prevail over another person’s competing interests.
Per the interpretation of the best interests standard by the Child Rights
Committee, so long as the interests of the child are properly weighed,
nothing requires that the child’s interests ultimately win out over opposing
considerations. In the setting of an unregulated custody transfer, the interests
of family privacy and parental privilege with respect to the custody and
control of their children must be weighed against the child’s best interests,
and it is not clear how the tension arising from these competing interests is
best addressed.
The incidents described in Part I highlight the potential dangers to which
children involved in an unregulated custody transfer may be exposed,
dangers that plainly are not in any child’s best interests. As noted above, the
best interests standard must be applied on a case-by-case basis, and there is
no definitive list of factors that must be considered. Indeed, the Child Rights
Committee stated, “[it] considers it useful to draw up a non-exhaustive and
non-hierarchical list of elements that could be included in a best interests
assessment by any decision-maker having to determine a child’s best
interests.”162 Such a list would provide guidance but would not necessarily
Professor of Law at Ohio State University and an expert in international law. See Faculty
Directory, THE OHIO STATE UNIV. MORITZ COL. OF L., http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/profes
sor/john-b-quigley/ (last visited June 13, 2017).
159
Quigley, supra note 158, at 405.
160
Jonathan Todres, Emerging Limitations on the Rights of the Child: The U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child and Its Early Case Law, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 159, 175
(1998).
161
Id. at 175.
162
General Comment on Art. 3, supra note 134, at V(A).
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dictate a specific course of action in a particular situation wherein a child’s
best interests must be determined. Although unregulated custody transfers
are not in the best interests of adopted children, it is unclear what must be
done to combat the practice by the United States at the national level. Since
the United States has traditionally left regulation of family matters to its
constituent states, it could simply opt to leave the regulation of those custody
transfers to those states. Regrettably, that approach has led to the untenable
situation described in Part II with relatively few U.S. states addressing
unregulated custody transfers via legislation, and widely varying legislation
in those U.S. states that have legislated against the practice in some way.
Since Article 21 of the Child Rights Convention states that the best
interests of the child becomes “the paramount consideration” when making
decisions regarding adoption, it could be argued that unregulated custody
transfers of adopted children are substantively different from transfers
involving non-adopted children.163 However, it is uncertain whether Article
21’s language would apply after an adoption has been completed, since
adoption decisions would have already been made and (in theory) completed
prior to any unregulated custody transfer. Even if one assumed that Article 21
would extend to decisions concerning an adopted child after the finalization of
an adoption, the United States is not bound by the terms of the Child Rights
Convention. Even if the Child Rights Committee’s interpretation of the best
interests standard within the context of Article 3 is taken as indicative of the
current scope of that standard as a matter of customary international law, that
interpretation does not elevate the best interests of the child to the level of “the
paramount consideration.” Since the Optional Protocols to which the United
States is a party do not cite the “paramount consideration” standard, and the
evidence suggests that customary international law encompasses only “a
primary consideration” standard, it would be difficult to argue that the United
States is explicitly obligated to take special action when adopted children are
involved. Bolstering that conclusion is the fact that the instrument pertaining
to adoption to which the United States is a party—the Hague Adoption
Convention—does not use the phrase “paramount consideration,” but rather
states that one of its objectives is “to establish safeguards to ensure that
intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the child. . . .”164 It
would be difficult to argue—given this language and the United States’ failure
to ratify the Child Rights Convention—that the United States considers itself
bound to make the child’s best interests anything more than a primary
consideration when decisions impacting the child’s welfare are made.
163
164

Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, art. 21.
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 98, art. 1(a).
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Although it seems clear that the United States is bound to make the best
interests of children a primary consideration when decisions affecting the
well-being of children are made, what that fact entails is undetermined. The
nature of the best interests standard makes it difficult to say it requires any
particular course of action in a given case; so long as the child’s best
interests are a primary consideration, a state may determine that other
considerations are more important. In the case of the United States, the
traditional role its constituent states have played in regulating family life, as
well as the competing rights and interests of a child’s parents, may make it
unattractive to attack the problem of unregulated custody transfers at the
national level.
However, even if the United States is not necessarily bound by the best
interests standard to take proactive measures against unregulated custody
transfers, either due to its treaty obligations or as a matter of customary
international law, it may be possible to demonstrate that the United States is
bound by other instruments to combat the practice. To that end, the next two
sections will explore whether unregulated custody transfers constitute a form
of either illegal adoption, human trafficking, or both, and whether the United
States is thereby obligated to combat those custody transfers.
B. Unregulated Custody Transfers do not Constitute Illegal Adoption Under
International Law
There are three ways that an adoption can be illegal, thereby undermining
or destroying the legal legitimacy of that adoption. The first is where parents
have bypassed the official system and directly procured a child in a foreign
country, then subsequently pretend that the child is theirs.165 Another similar
situation arises where the would-be parents who have bypassed the official
adoption system attempt to legitimize the adoption at a later date.166 Finally,
there are cases where “parents” go through the official adoption process in
good faith, but where there are fraudulent elements within the adoption
process, such as falsified documents, abduction of the child prior to adoption,
or coercion of the birth family to give up the child for adoption.167
Of the three scenarios listed above, the first most closely resembles an
unregulated custody transfer because of the intentional circumvention of
existing procedures for obtaining permanent custody of a child.168
165

de Witte, supra note 68, at 22–23.
Id. at 23.
167
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By bypassing the official safeguards spelled out at the national level and
under the terms of the Hague Adoption Convention, would-be adoptive
parents prevent states from ensuring that adoption proceedings “are made in
the best interests of the child and with respect for his or her fundamental
rights,”169 while simultaneously ensuring that birth parents are not being
exploited or coerced.170 Unregulated custody transfers bypass these same
safeguards with respect to the interests of the child, though it seems less
likely that parents are going to be exploited or coerced in these situations.
This failure to ensure that the best interests of the child are protected is in
contravention of Article 1 of the Hague Adoption Convention171 and Article
3 of the Child Rights Convention.172 Although Article 3 is binding on states
and state actors, not private individuals, the Convention does establish that
states have a responsibility for protecting the rights of children and taking
measures to ensure those rights are not infringed upon. It is difficult to see
why a state’s interest in protecting the rights of children within its
jurisdiction extends only to official acts; presumably, a state has an ongoing
interest in the continued protection and promotion of the rights of children
under its administrative purview. As such, it seems appropriate to consider
the best interests of a child within an unregulated custody transfer insofar as
the private actors involved in such a transfer are undermining the state’s
ability to live up to its commitments under the Child Rights Convention.
An argument can also be made that adoptive parents involved in an
unregulated custody transfer are similar to the birth parents in scenario three,
wherein coercion may have played a part in a birth parent’s decision to give
up their child for adoption. Many of the stories that first brought the practice
into the public consciousness involved parents who were desperate for
assistance and without sufficient support or options to properly deal with the
various behavioral, emotional, or psychological needs of adopted children.173
The availability of an unregulated custody transfer may have a coercive
effect on adoptive parents that would run counter to the intentions of the
Hague Adoption Convention. That Convention explicitly takes into account
is useful for temporary transfers so that the temporary custodian can make important legal
decisions regarding a child given into their custody. If, for example, a parent wishes to give a
family friend the authority to make medical decisions while the child is left in the friend’s care
while the parent is out of the country, then power of attorney is an appropriate and useful tool.
169
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 98, at Preamble.
170
Id. art. 4.
171
Id. art. 1.
172
Child Rights Convention, supra note 17, art. 3.
173
See, e.g., Meghan Twohey, The Child Exchange: Inside America’s Underground Market
for Adopted Children, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/adopti
on/#article/part3.
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the desire to avoid exploitation or coercion of birth parents, just as poverty
may be a coercive force in some of the poorer countries that traditionally
supply the children involved in intercountry adoptions.
Unregulated custody transfers are also comparable to illegal adoption,
because both involve active marketplaces wherein the children are obtained
by would-be parents. These markets have a very high demand relative to the
available supply of adoptable children; UNICEF has estimated that the ratio
of prospective parents to adoptable children was as high as fifty to one.174
This imbalance increases the likelihood that people will resort to means
outside of the official systems to obtain a child.175
It is important to note that illegal adoption usually involves the payment
of fees and other associated expenses, thereby bringing into the picture those
who would exploit this imbalance for their own financial gain.176 No such
profit-focused motivation appears to be driving the phenomenon of
unregulated custody transfers. However, that does not mean that there
cannot be an exchange of non-monetary consideration in such transfers, since
one person is getting a child through the exchange, thereby avoiding—
intentionally or not—the inherent costs associated with official adoption
processes. On the other side of the exchange, the biological parents are
unburdening themselves of a child they are either unwilling or unable to care
for. Thus, while profit might not be motivating the exchanges, unregulated
custody transfers still involve the same kind of supply and demand factors
that can drive a market in the unregulated transfer of custody of children.
If unregulated custody transfers are considered a form of illegal adoption,
there is still the question of how states are obligated to act. As discussed
supra in Part III.B, the Hague Adoption Convention was designed to avoid
illegal adoptions by establishing state oversight and regulation of the
adoption process so as to protect the parties involved. It does not, however,
have civil or criminal penalties built into it. The Child Rights Convention is
also not a criminal law instrument, but rather a binding treaty in which states
have assumed certain obligations to recognize and protect specified rights.
Illegal adoption is not specifically mentioned within that Convention, and
Article 21 obliges states parties to make efforts to ensure the propriety of the
adoption process via separate bilateral or multilateral agreements, but the
Convention does not provide for or require states to enact civil or criminal
penalties with respect to illegal adoption.177
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C. The United States is not Bound by the Child Rights Convention as a
Matter of Customary International Law
Even if the Child Rights Convention could obligate states parties to enact
measures to protect adopted children from unregulated custody transfers, the
United States would not be bound because it has only signed, but not ratified,
the Child Rights Conventions. As noted in Part III.D, there is an argument to
be made that, although not bound as a state party, the United States is
nonetheless bound by the Child Rights Convention as a matter of customary
international law. Recall that the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that
customary international law can be determinative so long as there are not
positive laws, executive actions, or court decisions that contradict the alleged
customary international law.178 With respect to unregulated custody
transfers, the U.S. Congress has not passed legislation on the topic, nor has
there been executive action or a federal court decision regarding the practice.
Currently, the cited provisions of the Child Rights Convention do not
conflict with standing U.S. law. The U.S. Supreme Court and several of the
U.S. federal circuit courts have favorably cited the Convention, which could
indicate that the United States subjectively considers itself bound to the
Child Rights Convention, at least in part. Unfortunately, given the small
number of federal cases that favorably cite the Child Rights Convention, as
well as the United States’ failure to even submit that Convention to its Senate
for ratification, it seems unlikely that the United States has adopted the
subjective stance required for customary international law to be binding on a
state, particularly when coupled with the United States’ general wariness of
international treaties.179
Ultimately, unregulated custody transfers could be reasonably construed
as a form of illegal adoption, thereby triggering provisions of the Child
Rights Convention and the Hague Adoption Convention. Unfortunately,
even if such transfers amount to illegal adoption, neither convention offers
much in the way of guidance as to what should be done to combat the
practice. As such, it may be better to consider whether unregulated custody
transfers and illegal adoption can be considered a form of human trafficking.
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D. Unregulated Custody Transfers do not Qualify as Human Trafficking
Under International Law
The Child Rights Convention, U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol, and the
Hague Adoption Convention do not speak to or define illegal adoption.
Given the loose connection between illegal adoption and human trafficking
within the international instruments discussed supra, the following analysis
will proceed solely on the merits of unregulated custody transfers, without
reference to illegal adoption.
As discussed in Part III, the three elements in the U.N. Anti-trafficking
Protocol are “activity,” “means,” and “purpose,” but only “activity” and
“purpose” need be discussed here, because the Protocol drops the
requirement to satisfy the “means” element when children are involved.180
Therefore, a child will be considered to have been a victim of human
trafficking provided that they are recruited, transported, transferred,
harbored, or received for the purposes of exploitation.181 Given that the
transfer and receipt of children are an inherent part of the practice of
unregulated custody challenges, whether or not such transfers constitute
human trafficking will turn on whether the children involved are being
exploited within the meaning of the instruments.
Discussing exploitation, the Anti-trafficking Protocol states that
“exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services,
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”182
None of the listed activities bear directly on the practice of unregulated
custody transfers, but the list was not intended to be exhaustive, as indicated
by the phrase “exploitation shall include, at a minimum” found within the
definition. The question then becomes whether unregulated custody
transfers are so closely analogous to the prohibited purposes as to justify its
inclusion under the “at a minimum” phrase.
Each of the prohibited purposes shares something in common with
unregulated custody transfers: they all commodify a child, insofar as the
child is effectively turned into a good that is introduced into a market to
fulfill a particular need. These activities place no emphasis on the best
interests of the child, but are instead oriented to satisfy the parties who are in
control of the child. Seen in this light, analogizing unregulated custody
transfers (and, for that matter, illegal adoptions) as a form of human
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trafficking is not particularly difficult. Adoptive parents need a way by
which they can divest themselves of custody of their adopted child and find
their way into a forum, such as an online messaging board, where they can
advertise their child to potentially interested parties. Other people, seeking
to avoid the formal adoption process—perhaps because they would fail to
qualify for adoption through official channels, or because they wish to avoid
the costs associated with the official process—arrange to take the child from
the adoptive parents and, with a simply drafted power of attorney, the
permanent transfer of custody of the child is effectuated. The child is handed
off, without oversight by a neutral third-party, regardless of the trauma and
distress caused by the entire process. This scenario is driven by the needs
and desires of the adults, not the child, and as such the transfer of that child
is much like the transfer of any good during a business transaction. The only
real difference is the lack of a monetary exchange, but, given the benefits
obtained by the adult parties through the custody transfer, the child has been
nonetheless commodified.183
It might be argued that this exchange is like that which takes place
through the formal adoption process—a process that is allowed and
promoted throughout the world—and therefore the description of
unregulated custody transfers as a form of exploitation must be fatally
flawed. There are two problems with this argument, however. First, both
illegal adoption and unregulated custody transfers can be seen as a response
to the huge demand by prospective parents and the much smaller supply of
adoptable children, and the potential monetary gains for those who facilitate
such adoptions. So long as there are would-be parents who desire children,
the adoption process may be corrupted to fulfill those desires at the expense
of the children (and the birth parents of those children).184 These improper
incentives set those illegal practices apart from legitimate adoptions, because
profit is not a consideration and a conflict of interests between those
facilitating the adoption and the best interests of the child (and the child’s
birth family) is avoided.
Second, there is a key difference between unregulated custody transfers
and adoptions. In any adoption governed by the Hague Adoption
Convention, the state intervenes as a third-party whose stated primary goal is
to promote the best interests of the child, thereby helping to mitigate
concerns that intercountry adoption can promote exploitative practices.
While adoptions performed in accordance with the Hague Adoption
Convention and in line with the mandates of the Child Rights Convention are
183
184

de Witte, supra note 68, at 59.
Id. at 24.

2017]

UNREGULATED CUSTODY TRANSFERS

219

by no means incorruptible, the presence of the sending and receiving states
acts as a potentially powerful way of protecting children from being
commodified and exploited for the sake of prospective parents and selfinterested adoption facilitators.
As has been shown, it can be argued that unregulated custody transfers
constitute human trafficking under the “at a minimum” phrase within the
U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol. Since the United States has ratified the U.N.
Anti-trafficking Protocol, it could be argued that the United States is bound
to take proactive measures to combat the practice of unregulated custody
transfers per the terms of those instruments. The U.N. Anti-trafficking
Protocol is of particular importance as a supplement to the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, because that Protocol it
is an international instrument that requires states to criminalize human
trafficking (as defined within the Anti-trafficking Protocol).
Most
importantly, the U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol commits states parties to a
proactive approach to combating human trafficking.185
Despite the foregoing arguments, it remains unclear whether unregulated
custody transfers would be considered a form of human trafficking. The
issue has not yet entered into international discourse, and it is uncertain if it
will ever do so, given the inherently underground nature of the practice.
Further, since illegal adoption—a related but more well-known and visible
phenomenon—has not been explicitly acknowledged as a form of human
trafficking absent subsequent exploitation, it seems unlikely that unregulated
custody transfers would be considered to have satisfied the constitutive
elements of human trafficking.
E. Recommendations
As has been demonstrated, the current state of both U.S. domestic law
and international law are ill-equipped to combat the problem of unregulated
custody transfers. The United States suffers from a lack of a cohesive
national strategy, and any measures taken to combat the practice have been
done at the level of the constituent states of the United States. Additionally,
the international community’s current understandings of both “illegal
adoption” and “human trafficking” do not seem broad enough to encompass
unregulated custody transfers. The difficulties inherent in tackling the
problem through a constituent state-by-state approach, as evidenced by the
sporadic, uneven, and often inadequate legislative responses at the level of
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the constituent states of the United States, suggests that a top-down approach
would be more effective.
Since the United States is the largest receiving country for intercountry
adoptions, focusing on the United States is an effective way to target the
practice of unregulated custody transfers, thereby protecting the single
largest population of internationally adopted children. As argued above, this
could be achieved most immediately by defining unregulated custody
transfers as either illegal adoption, human trafficking, or both, within the
context of the Child Rights Convention. The Child Rights Convention
would be an effective mechanism for achieving a widespread impact for
several reasons:
1.

2.

3.

The Child Rights Convention informs the definitions of
human trafficking and/or illegal adoption within the U.N.
Anti-trafficking Protocol186 and the Hague Adoption
Convention;187
The Child Rights Convention can be viewed as customary
international law that is binding on the United States with
respect to unregulated custody transfers, given the
country’s current commitments to combating human
trafficking and illegal adoption as evidenced by the fact
that it is a member of both the U.N. Anti-trafficking
Protocol and the Hague Adoption Convention; and
The Child Rights Convention acknowledges that children
are particularly vulnerable188 and countries should
proactively work to secure the fundamental rights of
children.189

If the trend towards a broader understanding of what constitutes illegal
adoption and/or human trafficking continues, it is not a stretch to say that
unregulated custody transfers should and will be considered a practice that
states should take proactive measures to combat. That being said, there is
still the question as to the best way to address the problem.
It is important to acknowledge that parents experiencing problems with
adopted children may honestly be looking for a way out that can preserve
both the best interests of the child and the parents, even if one must
simultaneously recognize that some adoptive parents may opt for an
186
187
188
189
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unregulated custody transfer for less altruistic reasons. Adopted children
have often suffered some form of trauma during their formative years and
this is especially true as the age of a child increases.190 This increases the
likelihood that they will experience developmental, physical, mental,
emotional, or behavioral issues,191 Unfortunately, it is common for adoptive
parents to have the child’s entire history of trauma hidden from them during
the adoption process.192 Similarly, parents in the United States often have
few options once the adoption is finalized, and they cannot simply divest
themselves of their parental responsibilities, without risking charges of child
abandonment or child endangerment, depending on the jurisdiction.193 Only
twenty U.S. states allow internationally adopted children to participate in
their post-adoption programs, per the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, leaving many parents without the resources they need to help their
child and themselves.194 Parents are left unsupported by the system that
facilitated the adoption in the first place, and without a legitimate means of
divesting themselves of parental responsibility when faced with the needs
their child has but which they are unable or unwilling to accommodate.
Considering these realities, there are three ways of approaching the
problem: prevention, intervention, and punishment. Of the three, prevention
and intervention would offer the greatest chance for success, since the
underground nature of unregulated custody transfers makes enforcement of
available penalties difficult.
It is unclear whether relatively weak
punishments would deter desperate parents. Further, enforcement steps
would be implemented too late in the child’s life, as they have already been
abandoned by their parents and exposed to potential abuse by the child’s new
custodians, in addition to the trauma inherent to the custody transfer.
Some U.S. jurisdictions have focused on intervention, rather than
punishment. For example, the state of Ohio has proposed legislation that is
unique within the United States.195 In situations where a non-parent has
presented a power of attorney to a mandatory reporter to make custodial
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decisions for a child, that mandatory reporter196 must inform the public
services agency within the county wherein that child resides.197 This could
dramatically increase the likelihood that an unregulated custody transfer
would come to the attention of the relevant child welfare agencies, giving
those agencies the opportunity to intervene and protect the best interests of
the child. Given that “best interests” guide child welfare law both in the
United States and around the world, the Ohio model should be considered
elsewhere as a potentially effective way to bring unregulated custody
transfers out of the darkness.
Although laws have been passed in some U.S. states focusing on
prohibiting the practice of unregulated custody transfers and creating criminal
penalties for those who engage in the practice, those laws fail to include
preventative strategies centered around post-adoption services. However,
increasing the availability of these services should be explored as a way to
prevent unregulated custody transfers from occurring in the first place.
Looking for a specific model on which to base a post-adoptive services
program is difficult, however, since the current situation within the United
States has been described by Evan Donaldson as “[a] checkered landscape of
programs, intervention models, therapies developed by adoption experts who
provide training across the nation and have authored books, and innovative
new approaches that seem promising but are much less well-known or
empirically tested.”198 Of those jurisdictions within the United States that do
offer services, none are comprehensive enough to encompass the plethora of
needs adoptive families have.199 A focused effort to examine the needs of
adoptive families is necessary to best serve them, thereby alleviating the
pressures that lead to unregulated custody transfers. While the exact services
that should be provided are beyond the scope of this Note, it is imperative that
commitments are made to provide those essential services.200
Before concluding, it should be noted that non-adoptive families are often
faced with similar pressures and challenges. Nothing about unregulated
custody transfers is specific to children adopted internationally or
domestically, even if it happens to be true that children who are adopted
internationally might be more likely to experience the types of trauma that
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would lead to behavioral problems that may disrupt family life.201 While
some U.S. states have targeted unregulated custody transfers only with
respect to adopted children,202 others have not made the distinction.203 This
inclusive approach should be followed, as the best interests of all children
are at the heart of child welfare systems throughout the world, as dictated
within the Child Rights Convention, the Hague Adoption Convention, and
numerous other human rights instruments. A struggling family can need
support regardless of how that family was formed.
V. CONCLUSION
Unregulated custody transfers expose internationally adopted children to
potentially significant harm, but the existing legal tools within the
international community are currently insufficient to help combat the
practice. The definitions of the two most closely-related practices—illegal
adoption and human trafficking—do not appear to encompass these transfers,
and the best interests standard is too indefinite to require states to take
proactive measures against unregulated custody transfers. Similarly, the
legal landscape within the United States demonstrates the difficulties
associated with a addressing the issue using a state-by-state approach.
Expanding the current definitions of human trafficking and illegal adoption
under international legal instruments like the Child Rights Convention and
the U.N. Anti-trafficking Protocol such that they encompass these custody
transfers could be an effective to motivate countries around the world to
proactively address the issue. States parties would be bound to take
measures to combat the practice, and even states that are not currently a party
to those instruments could arguably be bound as a matter of customary
international law. The world has recognized that children are especially
vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Battling unregulated custody transfers
by mandating state intervention ensures that the best interests of adopted
children can be more readily guaranteed and that unnecessary harms to those
children can be avoided.
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